the twentieth century has led to a consensus about the inevitability of local government decline, even though the timing of this decline is subject to debate. For England, a number of historians have located the decisive shift in central-local relations in Lloyd George's social reforms of I908-I, as these contained an unprecedented degree of central involvement in social policy.12 Others have argued that this transformation was new in a quantitative rather than qualitative sense, and note the seminal importance of the 1834 Poor Law Act in establishing the principle of state regulation over the locality.13 All the same, it seems clear that eventually, as urbanization and industrialization progressed, their negative effects could no longer be addressed at the local level and inevitably became a national concern. Similarly, scholars have pointed out that, from the turn of the century, German liberals abandoned obsolete ideals of the local community and directed their intellectual and political energies towards the central state.14 There are good reasons to doubt these generally accepted assumptions about the insignificance of local government in the nature of, and the prospects for, liberalism. 16 'Though the English have built the greatest towns the world has ever seen, they have always reminder about the continued importance of local government well into the twentieth century.17 The decline of local government has neither been obvious nor inevitable. Second, the local and state polities were closely linked. In the first-past-thepost systems used for national elections in both countries, even the most prominent MPs representing urban constituencies had to engage closely with the social and political hierarchy of the locality.18 Moreover, at a time when national government was still largely concerned with spending on defence, local government came to have a particular impact on people's lives through spending on education, drainage, libraries, public parks, and so on. 19 Municipal expenditure, in turn, necessitated the growth of local taxation, whose regressive impact continued to bedevil those responsible for local government in both countries.20 The expansion and politicization of local government activity from the i86os occurred in conjunction with a rapid expansion of the urban electorate at national and local level.21 It is unthinkable that the urban voters' overall perception of liberalism could remain unaffected by the consequences of liberal action in local government.
Third, to contemporary liberals the importance of local government was never in doubt. At an ideological level, liberals in both countries such as Rudolf Gneist, Otto Gierke, Josef Redlich, T. C. Horsfall, and W. H. Dawson profoundly influenced each other in the belief that local government was a pivotal instrument for encouraging citizenship and community. At a practical level, Gladstone and other Liberals were deeply interested in local government as an institution of community and civic engagement.22 If successive liberal governments failed to pass a comprehensive reform of local government, it was not for want of concern, but precisely because so many diffuse interests were at stake. Even when central government did manage to pass a major piece of local legislation, notably the Prussian finance reform of 1891/3 and the English Local Government Act of 1888, its provisions were quickly rendered insufficient exhibited a singular inability to organize, or even to understand, the true municipal life': The Spectator, 3262, 3 Jan. I89, pp. 7-8. 17 Daunton, ed., Cambridge urban history. reminder about the continued importance of local government well into the twentieth century.17 The decline of local government has neither been obvious nor inevitable. Second, the local and state polities were closely linked. In the first-past-thepost systems used for national elections in both countries, even the most prominent MPs representing urban constituencies had to engage closely with the social and political hierarchy of the locality.18 Moreover, at a time when national government was still largely concerned with spending on defence, local government came to have a particular impact on people's lives through spending on education, drainage, libraries, public parks, and so on. 19 Municipal expenditure, in turn, necessitated the growth of local taxation, whose regressive impact continued to bedevil those responsible for local government in both countries.20 The expansion and politicization of local government activity from the i86os occurred in conjunction with a rapid expansion of the urban electorate at national and local level.21 It is unthinkable that the urban voters' overall perception of liberalism could remain unaffected by the consequences of liberal action in local government.
Third, to contemporary liberals the importance of local government was never in doubt. At an ideological level, liberals in both countries such as Rudolf Gneist, Otto Gierke, Josef Redlich, T. C. Horsfall, and W. H. Dawson profoundly influenced each other in the belief that local government was a pivotal instrument for encouraging citizenship and community. At a practical level, Gladstone and other Liberals were deeply interested in local government as an institution of community and civic engagement.22 If successive liberal governments failed to pass a comprehensive reform of local government, it was not for want of concern, but precisely because so many diffuse interests were at stake. Even when central government did manage to pass a major piece of local legislation, notably the Prussian finance reform of 1891/3 and the English Local Government Act of 1888, its provisions were quickly rendered insufficient by the changing needs and spiralling demands of local government. For its dynamism, complexity, and sheer magnitude, the town mattered, and with it the way it was governed. 23 The following section establishes the ideological importance of local government in nineteenth-century liberalism. Thereafter, the liberal practice of local government is considered through a comparative analysis of the most prominent liberals engaged at the juncture between local and national politics in England and Germany, Joseph Chamberlain and Johannes Miquel. The article's comparative perspective allows a much more accurate appreciation of the nature of liberalism beyond a particular national context. The analysis focuses on England and Prussia, states that had a pivotal impact on perceptions of local government in their respective nations.24 In this way, it also offers a contribution to persistent debates about the 'peculiarities' of Britain and Germany, which are often asserted, but only too rarely proven. The most trenchant analyses about liberalism in Germany and Britain still date back to the height of the Sonderweg debate,25 but little comparative work has been done on more recent historiographical concerns, for instance about the nature of political cultures, identity, and the relationship between different levels of government.26 This article asserts that liberalism cannot be properly understood without an appreciation of its local government dimension. In England and Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, the social and political problems inherent in rapid urbanization and industrialization were problems for local government first and foremost. Moreover, the relative weakness of the central state in the nineteenth century left liberals in national and state politics relatively little room for political manoeuvre. It was left to liberals at the local level to develop comprehensive, innovative, and regulatory policies for social welfare, the labour market, education, and public health. From the second half of the nineteenth century, the viability of liberalism was contingent upon its performance in local government. 23 Daunton, ed., Cambridge urban history; H. Laski, ed., A century of municipal progress, I835-935 (London, I935). 24 In Britain, local government legislation was different for England and Scotland. In Germany, local government was a state matter, and Prussia is taken as representative due to its size, its complexity, and the model function it acquired with the promulgation of the Civic Ordinance in 1808. In this article, references to the 'state' and 'national' levels both refer to Westminster, while in the German case they distinguish the individual state levels from the national, federal polity. 25 D. Langewiesche, ed., Liberalismus im z9. Jahrhundert: Deutschland im europdischen Vergleich (Gottingen, 1985) by the changing needs and spiralling demands of local government. For its dynamism, complexity, and sheer magnitude, the town mattered, and with it the way it was governed.23
The following section establishes the ideological importance of local government in nineteenth-century liberalism. Thereafter, the liberal practice of local government is considered through a comparative analysis of the most prominent liberals engaged at the juncture between local and national politics in England and Germany, Joseph Chamberlain and Johannes Miquel. The article's comparative perspective allows a much more accurate appreciation of the nature of liberalism beyond a particular national context. The analysis focuses on England and Prussia, states that had a pivotal impact on perceptions of local government in their respective nations.24 In this way, it also offers a contribution to persistent debates about the 'peculiarities' of Britain and Germany, which are often asserted, but only too rarely proven. The most trenchant analyses about liberalism in Germany and Britain still date back to the height of the Sonderweg debate,25 but little comparative work has been done on more recent historiographical concerns, for instance about the nature of political cultures, identity, and the relationship between different levels of government.26 This article asserts that liberalism cannot be properly understood without an appreciation of its local government dimension. In England and Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, the social and political problems inherent in rapid urbanization and industrialization were problems for local government first and foremost. Moreover, the relative weakness of the central state in the nineteenth century left liberals in national and state politics relatively little room for political manoeuvre. It was left to liberals at the local level to develop comprehensive, innovative, and regulatory policies for social welfare, the labour market, education, and public health. From the second half of the nineteenth century, the viability of liberalism was contingent upon its performance in local government. 23 Daunton, ed., Cambridge urban history; H. Laski, ed., A century of municipal progress, I835-935 (London, I935). 24 In Britain, local government legislation was different for England and Scotland. In Germany, local government was a state matter, and Prussia is taken as representative due to its size, its complexity, and the model function it acquired with the promulgation of the Civic Ordinance in 1808. In this article, references to the 'state' and 'national' levels both refer to Westminster, while in the German case they distinguish the individual state levels from the national, federal polity. 25 D. Langewiesche, ed., Liberalismus im z9. Jahrhundert: Deutschland im europdischen Vergleich (Gottingen, 1985) 35 The Benthamite proponents for central legislation led by Chadwick condemned local government on the grounds that it was corrupt and incompetent. 36 The defenders of local government spearheaded by Joshua Toulmin Smith, on the other hand, argued that national legislation would infringe upon the principles of selfgovernment, and thus be unconstitutional. Pitting 'teutonic' ideals of local 'self-'government against notions of Roman-centralist rule, true local government would itself lead to the liberal values of self-respect and self-control.37 Social reform (and thus an increase of local rates to pay for it)38 was thus dispensed with, and replaced by, the ideal of self-government. Once again, it is extremely difficult to attach exclusive political labels to this debate.39 Through his particular appeal both to the status quo and his traditionalist perception of the constitution, Toulmin Smith attracted the support of many tory, whig, and radical ratepayers alike.40 In England and in Germany, then, urban local goverment legislation in the first half of the nineteenth century responded primarily to practical need rather than ideological design. In turn, support for (or rejection of) enhanced local government in towns and cities cut across party lines.
From the middle of the nineteenth century local government became increasingly a liberal concern. The new social elites that had gained political power in the cities were, by definition, more likely to sympathize with the party of 'progress', in preference to the party of the establishment. In northern English towns, liberal dissenting elites usually became formidable and wellorganized rivals to the traditional tory elites of the old corporations.41 In Germany, the most striking example is Wurttemberg, where local government aimed to reduce the tory partisanship of existing local corporations, to ensure public order, and to integrate new commercial wealth into the political realm. 34 existed in England and Wales, which levied eighteen different kinds of rates.50 The difficulty of efficient administration was clear for all to see, but it was the liberals and radicals who came to demand a greater pooling of authorities in the hands of the municipal councils, at the expense of the counties -an issue that came to a head in Salisbury's I888 Local Government Act.51 At issue was also what kind of property should be subject to taxation. Liberals complained that urban improvements were paid for by rents passed on to urban dwellers, but that the benefits of higher property values accrued to houseowners, who were often rural landowners.52
Efficiency in local government was important for its own sake, but it was also inextricably linked to the national polity. From the I87os and especially during Gladstone's second administration, the great Liberal reform projects were seriously hampered by the amount of parliamentary time that had to be devoted to an ever growing number of private and local Acts. A more efficient and accountable local government would enable the Imperial Parliament to delegate more powers, and in this way become more efficient itself. It is no concidence that the local government reforms of 1835 and 1888 followed on the heels of the franchise reforms of I832 and I884/5 respectively.53 Local government was an integral part of the liberal concern for representative government.
During the i86os and I870s, then, local self-government became a distinctively liberal concern. Indeed, liberalism was uniquely suited to this golden age of urban government in the decades before I900. An emphasis on local diversity was difficult to deal with for collectivist socialism, and it was not existed in England and Wales, which levied eighteen different kinds of rates.50 The difficulty of efficient administration was clear for all to see, but it was the liberals and radicals who came to demand a greater pooling of authorities in the hands of the municipal councils, at the expense of the counties -an issue that came to a head in Salisbury's I888 Local Government Act.51 At issue was also what kind of property should be subject to taxation. Liberals complained that urban improvements were paid for by rents passed on to urban dwellers, but that the benefits of higher property values accrued to houseowners, who were often rural landowners.52
During the i86os and I870s, then, local self-government became a distinctively liberal concern. Indeed, liberalism was uniquely suited to this golden age of urban government in the decades before I900. An emphasis on local diversity was difficult to deal with for collectivist socialism, and it was not easy to address in principle by conservatism with its emphasis on rural harmony, king, and country.54 In the words of the Liverpool tory Thomas Hughes, who was to become lord mayor in 1887, there was simply no 'connection between Conservative principles and the general policy of sewage and roadmaking'.55 By contrast, with its close links to the Protestant, commercial, and industrial bourgeoisie, and with its inherent emphasis on self-help, political education, and community, no political philosophy was as predisposed to local government as liberalism.56 This was particularly important when liberal concepts of the Volk in Germany, or the community in England, became challenged at the national level. In the locality, a common weal was much easier to manufacture and identify, and its concerns were much easier to address in practice. Local government acquired a unique and crucial function as a political educator and moderator in an age of rapid political and social transition. Such a view could accommodate even important differences in perspectives between liberals. Most German liberals considered local government largely as a mediator between an authoritarian state and society, while British liberals were ultimately guided by moral concerns about the effect of good government on the individual within society.57 Yet in both countries liberals were in no doubt that the locality was an integral part of their overall concern for good government. help, political education, and community, no political philosophy was as predisposed to local government as liberalism.56 This was particularly important when liberal concepts of the Volk in Germany, or the community in England, became challenged at the national level. In the locality, a common weal was much easier to manufacture and identify, and its concerns were much easier to address in practice. Local government acquired a unique and crucial function as a political educator and moderator in an age of rapid political and social transition. Such a view could accommodate even important differences in perspectives between liberals. Most German liberals considered local government largely as a mediator between an authoritarian state and society, while British liberals were ultimately guided by moral concerns about the effect of good government on the individual within society.57 Yet in both countries liberals were in no doubt that the locality was an integral part of their overall concern for good government.
II

In England, it is difficult to think of a more prominent exponent of the liberal ideal of local government than Joseph Chamberlain. His radical pretensions notwithstanding, he fully agreed with Mill and Brodrick that local government was an important facilitator of constitutional and social harmony. What made Chamberlain so important in the liberal worldview, however, was Chamberlain's successful response, as mayor, to the liberal preoccupation with local government efficiency. In Chamberlain's view, a streamlining of local authorities was critical not just because greater powers for a single body induced able men to participate in that body, but because it would 'lead directly to a double economy -of governing material, and of the cost of administration'. Ideally, local government would avoid waste and administrative confusion. The role of central government, in turn, was akin to that of a parent company which would supervise and publish annual local government returns to maximize accountability and transparency.58
In Germany, the most prominent liberal engaged in local government was Johannes Miquel. He not only became the authority on local government 56 The importance of key concepts of self-help, education (Bildung), efficiency, and community for liberalism as evident in the works of Mill and Green is outlined in M. Freeden, Ideologies and political theory: a conceptual approach (Oxford, I996), pp. help, political education, and community, no political philosophy was as predisposed to local government as liberalism.56 This was particularly important when liberal concepts of the Volk in Germany, or the community in England, became challenged at the national level. In the locality, a common weal was much easier to manufacture and identify, and its concerns were much easier to address in practice. Local government acquired a unique and crucial function as a political educator and moderator in an age of rapid political and social transition. Such a view could accommodate even important differences in perspectives between liberals. Most German liberals considered local government largely as a mediator between an authoritarian state and society, while British liberals were ultimately guided by moral concerns about the effect of good government on the individual within society.57 Yet in both countries liberals were in no doubt that the locality was an integral part of their overall concern for good government.
In Germany, the most prominent liberal engaged in local government was Johannes Miquel. He not only became the authority on local government among National Liberals, but his position on local government was widely accepted by left liberals who were otherwise highly critical of his views, notably Eugen Richter and Hugo PreuB.59 Miquel's language and actions displayed the classic liberal concern about the role of local government for political integration and harmony. Faced, at the national and state levels, with an authoritarian government on the one hand, and the pressures of universal manhood suffrage on the other, Miquel considered local government with its restrictive franchise a haven of rational political discourse, and of political compromise. In this calmer and more reflective atmosphere, it was possible to arrive at carefully considered liberal policies for the common weal, for the benefit of every section of society. Miquel could fully subscribe to the Chamberlainite goal of local government, 'to promote the common good of the community by the free consent and united labour of all classes of its citizens'.60 Effective local government reduced the need for bureaucracy, and this had a dual advantage: it was more efficient, and it limited the scope of the state. Miquel agreed, then, with the general liberal principle that local government was the link between state and society, but his views contain an important shift of emphasis in German liberal ideals of local government. Miquel's conviction and experience that local government worked led him to advocate for it much greater powers than most German liberals on the right had been prepared to accept, most notably with regard to policing powers. The greater the power of local government vis-a-vis the state, the greater its efficiency, and the greater its ability to ameliorate social conflict and broker in the growing tensions The crucial point is that the parameters of nineteenth-century liberalism allowed Chamberlain and Miquel so much room for manoeuvre that they did not need to venture beyond these boundaries to realize their quest for an urban community. Liberals had accepted that localities were, by definition, smaller, more homogeneous, and more flexible. Innovations could be tried out without much risk. That this perception had become standard liberal fare by the I88os is evidenced, for instance, by Gladstone's ideal, the transformation of the local level into 'ratepayers' democracies' with greatest possible financial freedom. He fully appreciated that these communities might elect to pursue high levels of spending, in complete defiance of Gladstonian financial precepts at national level. But, given the limited geographical nature of each individual locality, this was of little consequence overall, and a risk worth taking in the interest of individual financial responsibility.81
Miquel's and Chamberlain's ideas about a harmonious urban community were closely reflected in their conceptions about the urban polity. As government at the national and state levels became increasingly complex and remote, the importance of local government as a forum for individual engagement and creativity increased. To be sure, active participation in local government remained the prerogative of the middle and lower middle classes, but the propertyless and disenfranchised working classes would benefit from this, too. For at the more intimate local level, it was much easier for a political elite to act in co-operation and harmony with the working classes. Here, elites were more attuned to the actual needs of the working classes, which in turn were much more willing to trust in the leadership of the elites.82 Indeed, one of the major arguments used in favour of local political organization in England and Germany was precisely the fact that party organization would take the power from the elites and ensure the fair representation of all.83 By implication, at the local level an extension of the franchise was no longer necessary to achieve a fair representation. This contradictory relationship within urban liberalism, between progressive and emancipatory social policies on the one hand, and a dogged insistence on a discriminating franchise based on property on the other, has exercised the minds particularly of German historians for over a decade. The liberal refusal to extend the local franchise to mirror the national franchise marked a decisive The crucial point is that the parameters of nineteenth-century liberalism allowed Chamberlain and Miquel so much room for manoeuvre that they did not need to venture beyond these boundaries to realize their quest for an urban community. Liberals had accepted that localities were, by definition, smaller, more homogeneous, and more flexible. Innovations could be tried out without much risk. That this perception had become standard liberal fare by the I88os is evidenced, for instance, by Gladstone's ideal, the transformation of the local level into 'ratepayers' democracies' with greatest possible financial freedom. He fully appreciated that these communities might elect to pursue high levels of spending, in complete defiance of Gladstonian financial precepts at national level. But, given the limited geographical nature of each individual locality, this was of little consequence overall, and a risk worth taking in the interest of individual financial responsibility.81
Miquel's and Chamberlain's ideas about a harmonious urban community were closely reflected in their conceptions about the urban polity. As government at the national and state levels became increasingly complex and remote, the importance of local government as a forum for individual engagement and creativity increased. To be sure, active participation in local government remained the prerogative of the middle and lower middle classes, but the propertyless and disenfranchised working classes would benefit from this, too. For at the more intimate local level, it was much easier for a political elite to act in co-operation and harmony with the working classes. Here, elites were more attuned to the actual needs of the working classes, which in turn were much more willing to trust in the leadership of the elites.82 Indeed, one of the major arguments used in favour of local political organization in England and Germany was precisely the fact that party organization would take the power from the elites and ensure the fair representation of all.83 By implication, at the local level an extension of the franchise was no longer necessary to achieve a fair representation. This contradictory relationship within urban liberalism, between progressive and emancipatory social policies on the one hand, and a dogged insistence on a discriminating franchise based on property on the other, has exercised the minds particularly of German historians for over a decade. The liberal refusal to extend the local franchise to mirror the national franchise marked a decisive The problem with the property-based local franchise was not the loss of liberal credibility it entailed amongst the disenfranchised, but the disproportionate weight it rendered to the enfranchised. In Britain, both the franchise and local taxation (the rates) were tied directly to property. Throughout the nineteenth century, English local government continued to be heavily reliant on the rates for its income, so that ratepayers were disproportionately affected by increases in local government expenditure. The problem was confounded by the regressive incidence of the rates, which were often passed on to occupiers and which hit many artisans, tradesmen and other urban dwellers on the economic margins particularly hard. In Germany, by contrast, there were two principal sources of taxation. Supplements to income tax became the principal source of local taxation, whereas taxation on property was the most important direct tax at a local level. Both types of taxation were reflected in the urban franchise. Citizens with high incomes (who were usually also propertyowners) were favoured at the polls, either through the three-class franchise or the existence of a census threshold. In addition, in most German states at least half the local councillors had to be propertyowners.
Since local government in both countries had strong in-built mechanisms to guard the interests of local taxpayers,86 finance became a major determinant of its success.87 Chamberlain's popularity derived first and foremost from the financial success of his policies. For to realize his ideal of efficient and allembracing local government against the ratepayers' obstruction, Chamberlain The problem with the property-based local franchise was not the loss of liberal credibility it entailed amongst the disenfranchised, but the disproportionate weight it rendered to the enfranchised. In Britain, both the franchise and local taxation (the rates) were tied directly to property. Throughout the nineteenth century, English local government continued to be heavily reliant on the rates for its income, so that ratepayers were disproportionately affected by increases in local government expenditure. The problem was confounded by the regressive incidence of the rates, which were often passed on to occupiers and which hit many artisans, tradesmen and other urban dwellers on the economic margins particularly hard. In Germany, by contrast, there were two principal sources of taxation. Supplements to income tax became the principal source of local taxation, whereas taxation on property was the most important direct tax at a local level. Both types of taxation were reflected in the urban franchise. Citizens with high incomes (who were usually also propertyowners) were favoured at the polls, either through the three-class franchise or the existence of a census threshold. In addition, in most German states at least half the local councillors had to be propertyowners.
Since local government in both countries had strong in-built mechanisms to guard the interests of local taxpayers,86 finance became a major determinant of its success.87 Chamberlain's popularity derived first and foremost from the financial success of his policies. For to realize his ideal of efficient and allembracing local government against the ratepayers' obstruction, Chamberlain The complexity of the inter-and intra-denominational fissures on education led to the controversies surrounding the i870 and I902 Education Acts in England. By contrast, in Prussia it was not even possible to pass a state-wide education law before I918. Its simultaneous importance and divisiveness predisposed education for local government. For at this level, education could be organized and funded according to the particular make-up of the locality. The problem this entailed, of course, was that at the local level opposition could be expressed much more easily, hence denominational matters could be politicized much more effectively. It is no accident that Chamberlain saw to it that elections to, and the proceedings of, the new Birmingham Local School Board became subject to Liberal caucus control. Even in Frankfurt, a city with one of the lowest rates of religious observance in Germany, local opposition to its system of non-denominational education mounted until the liberals suffered a heavy defeat at the local elections of 1904 on precisely this issue.93 Clearly, church-state relations were a key problem for liberals in England and Germany just as elsewhere in Europe. However, liberals learnt the lesson from the Kulturkampfin Prussia and the 1870 Education Act in England respectively. By transferring their concern for education to the local level, liberals shifted the divisive debate over education away from the state, to the level of local government. In addition, the localization of the (financial) responsibilities for schooling ensured state control without necessitating a dramatic increase in public spending by the state.
Education became a local government concern for liberalism not simply because of the state's inability to deal with this issue. Urban liberals welcomed the burdens of financing and organizing education because it was central to their ideal of a forward-looking society imbued with science and rationality. Upon arriving in Osnabriick, Miquel immediately set to revive the city's economic development through establishing a technical secondary school relatively unusual system of non-denominational education against the Prussian Ministry of Education. However, it would be misleading to characterize both men as 'typical' liberals in this regard. Chamberlain may have appealed to liberals of his nonconformist background, but there were plenty of Anglican liberals who were happy to accept Gladstone's compromise to support church schools through rates. In Prussia the divisions among liberals on this issue were more complex, since they did not run parallel to, but across, denominational divides. Rural as well as orthodox Lutheran liberals tended to side with Roman Catholics in favour of church-controlled primary schools, against many (but by no means all) urban and liberal Lutherans who opposed them.92
The complexity of the inter-and intra-denominational fissures on education led to the controversies surrounding the i870 and I902 Education Acts in England. By contrast, in Prussia it was not even possible to pass a state-wide education law before I918. Its simultaneous importance and divisiveness predisposed education for local government. For at this level, education could be organized and funded according to the particular make-up of the locality. The problem this entailed, of course, was that at the local level opposition could be expressed much more easily, hence denominational matters could be politicized much more effectively. It is no accident that Chamberlain saw to it that elections to, and the proceedings of, the new Birmingham Local School Board became subject to Liberal caucus control. Even in Frankfurt, a city with one of the lowest rates of religious observance in Germany, local opposition to its system of non-denominational education mounted until the liberals suffered a heavy defeat at the local elections of 1904 on precisely this issue.93 Clearly, church-state relations were a key problem for liberals in England and Germany just as elsewhere in Europe. However, liberals learnt the lesson from the Kulturkampfin Prussia and the 1870 Education Act in England respectively. By transferring their concern for education to the local level, liberals shifted the divisive debate over education away from the state, to the level of local government. In addition, the localization of the (financial) responsibilities for schooling ensured state control without necessitating a dramatic increase in public spending by the state.
Education became a local government concern for liberalism not simply because of the state's inability to deal with this issue. Urban liberals welcomed the burdens of financing and organizing education because it was central to their ideal of a forward-looking society imbued with science and rationality. Upon arriving in Osnabriick, Miquel immediately set to revive the city's economic development through establishing a technical secondary school the specific municipal culture reflected in such monuments was expressed also in distinctive rituals of social festivals as well as rhetoric.98 Urban liberal politics was not simply about what civic leaders did, it was also about how their actions were communicated, and how the community that they strove for was 'imagined'. Highly aware of the particular political environments within which they operated, Chamberlain nurtured his image of'RadicalJoe', while Miquel was happy with a reputation that was rather more refined and detached. Through populist language and appeals to social justice, and (not least) through the persistent use of religious allusions in his rhetoric, Chamberlain acquired a mass following in a way Miquel never did, nor ever needed to do. Beyond these very important differences, however, both responded to, and in turn helped develop, a specific language of community and civic pride which formed the pillar of their municipal endeavours, and which became central to urban liberalism. With extreme skill Chamberlain amplified and gave cohesion to a municipal self-consciousness which emphasized the civic community's (and, by extension, his own) radicalism and the citizens' supposed straightforwardness. In turn, these were closely related to the community's industry, inventiveness, harmony, and vision. Birmingham council members refused to wear robes during meetings to emphasize their simplicity. In this spirit, the council had refused to spend any public money in celebration of the prince of Wales's wedding in 1863. By contrast, it was happy to celebrate the laying of the foundation stone to the new Council House in 1874 with a fireworks display in the evening. Finally, there were a number of celebrations and festivals in which the city's radical self-understanding was fostered, such as the exuberant jubilee celebrations held, without any public subsidy of course, forJohn Bright in I883.99 Similarly, Chamberlain used the unveiling of the Priestley memorial in 1874 to underline his own agenda for urban reform through self-help and education.100 Chamberlain did not invent Birmingham's identity, but his success legitimized it as never before, making it respectable even beyond the confines of Birmingham. He showed his critics in and beyond Birmingham what the city could do, so much so that when he hosted the prince and princess of Wales in 1874, the visit did not become an embarrassment to, but a confirmation of, the language of local pride notions of equality, tolerance, education, selfimprovement, and community are visible which do point to a distinctly liberal self-image. Such a civic identity became the closest answer the liberals ever had to a milieu, an identity of belonging that went beyond the purely political, and identified community of sentiment and patterns of behaviour.10 And yet, if the liberal ideal of a civic community was a receipe for success, it also contained within itself severe limitations. In the first instance, the liberal ideal of urban progress was not always compatible with the concerns of shopowners and artisans who feared precisely the economic forces which the liberals sought to promote. More importantly, as this article has shown, urban government, despite its communitarian ideals, was always divided in practice -not simply by class or religion, but by property. In the last instance, with liberals unwilling to address the prominence of property, it was only national policies which could ultimately erode this social divisiveness which the liberals, ironically, did everything to uphold. language of local pride notions of equality, tolerance, education, selfimprovement, and community are visible which do point to a distinctly liberal self-image. Such a civic identity became the closest answer the liberals ever had to a milieu, an identity of belonging that went beyond the purely political, and identified community of sentiment and patterns of behaviour.10 And yet, if the liberal ideal of a civic community was a receipe for success, it also contained within itself severe limitations. In the first instance, the liberal ideal of urban progress was not always compatible with the concerns of shopowners and artisans who feared precisely the economic forces which the liberals sought to promote. More importantly, as this article has shown, urban government, despite its communitarian ideals, was always divided in practice -not simply by class or religion, but by property. In the last instance, with liberals unwilling to address the prominence of property, it was only national policies which could ultimately erode this social divisiveness which the liberals, ironically, did everything to uphold. language of local pride notions of equality, tolerance, education, selfimprovement, and community are visible which do point to a distinctly liberal self-image. Such a civic identity became the closest answer the liberals ever had to a milieu, an identity of belonging that went beyond the purely political, and identified community of sentiment and patterns of behaviour.10 And yet, if the liberal ideal of a civic community was a receipe for success, it also contained within itself severe limitations. In the first instance, the liberal ideal of urban progress was not always compatible with the concerns of shopowners and artisans who feared precisely the economic forces which the liberals sought to promote. More importantly, as this article has shown, urban government, despite its communitarian ideals, was always divided in practice -not simply by class or religion, but by property. In the last instance, with liberals unwilling to address the prominence of property, it was only national policies which could ultimately erode this social divisiveness which the liberals, ironically, did everything to uphold. To liberals in Germany and Britain, local government in the I87os and I88os was able to provide innovative responses to a range of issues, from innovative social policies to denominational flexibility, from educational concerns to administrative and economic efficiency. To them it was clear that in an increasingly complex and heterogeneous world it was local government that could best deliver community, responsibility, and citizenship. The faith which they and other liberals put into an innovative, Protestant/ nonconformist, efficient and all-embracing civic liberalism was highly rational given that in Germany, for instance, local government's share of total public expenditure increased faster than that of government at the state or national levels.ll3 The problem with the liberal view of local government was not the vision itself-the problem was that the foundations upon which this vision was based changed so rapidly that, by the First World War, it had become untenable.
III
Local government had commended itself to liberal practitioners of local government as the laboratory for reform, especially with regard to social policy. Yet once effective responses to social problems had been tried and tested, the transition to a wider provision of these solutions beyond the purely been taken over by central government in its attempts to deal with the complexities of a rapidly transforming society. It was central, not local, government to which came the task of addressing problems of social inequality and economic insecurity, as local government stumbled from one financial crisis to the next, finding it difficult to meet existing obligations, let alone expanding these for the future. This raises the fundamental question whether the liberals' reliance on local government was realistic in the first place, or whether it was already outdated at the point of inception. Put differently, if even forward-looking liberals who were alert to the social changes around them considered local government an adequate response to these problems, it might underline the point that liberalism was simply unable to recognize and cope with the sheer scale of the social and political problems of the industrial era.ll2
To liberals in Germany and Britain, local government in the I87os and I88os was able to provide innovative responses to a range of issues, from innovative social policies to denominational flexibility, from educational concerns to administrative and economic efficiency. To them it was clear that in an increasingly complex and heterogeneous world it was local government that could best deliver community, responsibility, and citizenship. The faith which they and other liberals put into an innovative, Protestant/ nonconformist, efficient and all-embracing civic liberalism was highly rational given that in Germany, for instance, local government's share of total public expenditure increased faster than that of government at the state or national levels.ll3 The problem with the liberal view of local government was not the vision itself-the problem was that the foundations upon which this vision was based changed so rapidly that, by the First World War, it had become untenable.
Local government had commended itself to liberal practitioners of local government as the laboratory for reform, especially with regard to social policy. Yet once effective responses to social problems had been tried and tested, the transition to a wider provision of these solutions beyond the purely local arena was the logical next step. Similarly, once controversial schemes (such as public housing) had gained more widespread acceptance through their success, it was time to apply them at the national level. Local government maintained its usefulness with regard to the practical application of social policies because of its continued immediacy to social problems. But as soon as national government had made that conceptual sea-change in accepting responsibility for social policy, local government was destined to become the executor, rather than the motivator, of social reform.
One major policy arena in which local government had asserted itself over the second half of the nineteenth century was education, principally because it was able to benefit from the difficulty of central government to respond to denominational concerns over education at the state and national levels. With the retreat of religious controversy from the public sphere, the crucial stumbling block for national/state-wide educational provision was removed. In England, this process was largely complete by the I920S. In Germany, by contrast, the continuity of religious strife apparent until the educational debates of the 96os was one important reason for the prolonged importance of local government throughout the Weimar period.ll4 Ultimately, in both countries the reliance on local government for religious mediation was bound to decline as religious observance declined and spirituality retreated into the private domain.
Local government had been able to provide an enlightened response to urbanization through the provision of parks, street clearances, sanitation, the municipalization of urban transport, and so on. These provisions, however, came at a cost. As their realization became a generally accepted local government concern, the difference in quality and scope of municipal provisions grew sharply according to the quality of the local tax base. What had once been the underlying rationale for liberal attitudes towards local government, that differences in local spending were acceptable, even desirable, was increasingly challenged. The more general was the acceptance of local provision for education, sanitation, recreation, education, and infrastructure, the more unacceptable were sharp differences in the quality of their provision. In this way, the success of liberalism in local government created the conditions for its impending redundancy.
Moreover, much of the mounting debt incurred for the local government provision had been taken up under the impression of constantly rising revenue from a growing local tax base. Yet when urban growth slackened, first in Britain and then in Germany, many public utilities which had been provided on a grand scale left behind them a crippling trail of debt. In consequence, local government was forced to shift to a much less progressive and expansionary role. In Britain, this shifting role of local government was expressed by its local arena was the logical next step. Similarly, once controversial schemes (such as public housing) had gained more widespread acceptance through their success, it was time to apply them at the national level. Local government maintained its usefulness with regard to the practical application of social policies because of its continued immediacy to social problems. But as soon as national government had made that conceptual sea-change in accepting responsibility for social policy, local government was destined to become the executor, rather than the motivator, of social reform.
Moreover, much of the mounting debt incurred for the local government provision had been taken up under the impression of constantly rising revenue from a growing local tax base. Yet when urban growth slackened, first in Britain and then in Germany, many public utilities which had been provided on a grand scale left behind them a crippling trail of debt. In consequence, local government was forced to shift to a much less progressive and expansionary role. In Britain, this shifting role of local government was expressed by its growing dependence on grants-in-aid since Gladstone's 1870 Education Act,115 while in Germany the First World War marked a sharp caesura in the way in which local government was perceived. As local government initiative was stifled by a shrinking material base, its rhetoric, the social and visual manifestations of distinctive local pride, were increasingly difficult to sustain. If, despite growing evidence that urban authorities were living beyond their means, local government activity was seen with near unbridled optimism right up to 1914, city councils found themselves hopelessly overburdened with debt in the Weimar Republic. Hyperinflation brought about a rather ambiguous reprieve, but the Great Depression gave local government its coup de grace.
The final and crucial pillar upon which liberal assumptions of local government rested was its administrative efficiency. Given the paralysis often affecting state and federal governments from I87I to the foundation of the two Germanies, the constancy, effectiveness, and political maturity of local government is indeed striking. 
